Growth Prospects and Challenges in the Global Economy: Building Blocks Of Sustainable Economic Growth Strategies

ISEO

June 16, 2014 Michael Spence

Bad Ideas Defective or Unsustainable Growth Models with Built In Decelerators

- Import substitution
- Excess economic diversification
- Natural resources and the Dutch Disease
- Excess consumption (private of gov't or both)
 - Deficient investment
 - Usually excess debt
 - Excess reliance on domestic demand for growth and employment
 - USA, UK, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal
- Excess investment
 - Low return trap
 - China
- Resource and environmental constraints on the size of the global economy
 - These issues are global and longer term


Why Do The Structural Elements of Growth Dynamics Matter?


 The straight answer is that it virtually impossible to understand the growth dynamics in advanced and developing countries and the potential for defective growth patterns and recovery mechanisms without paying attention to differences between the tradable and non-tradable sectors in the factors that stimulate and constrain growth.

Brief Snapshot

- The US is growing at 1.5 -2.0% real it is a partial recovery lead by the private sector and structural shifts
- Europe is in for an extended period of low growth (and negative in the south) because the growth engines are blocked
- China will transition to a new growth pattern and sustain 7% plus growth
- The major emerging economies having hit by slow AC growth and unconventional monetary policy externalities, will go back to sustained high growth patterns


DEVELOPING COUNTRY SHARE OF GLOBAL OUTPUT






• OECD

Chinese Economy is Half the Size of the USA or EU It is also Almost as Big as the Other BRICS Plus Mexico and Indonesia Combined




The Share of the Tradable Part of the Global Economy is Growing



Source: DOTS, WEO and UN Comtrade. The ratio for 1949-61 is calcuated based on 15 major exporters.

Changing Patterns of Global Trade Strategy, Policy and Review Department, IMF, June 2011

Multi-polar Network Structure Rapidly Evolving



Source: DOTS and Fund staff estimates.

Atomization of Global Supply Chains




Figure 9. Foreign Contents in Gross Exports


Source: Fund staff estimates using OECD Input-Output Tables, UN Comtrade and OECD STAN data.

GROWTH MODELS AND DYANMICS

- Long run determinants of growth TFP
- Demand is largely missing
 - Except for the investment (=savings) element of the composition of aggregate demand matters
- But key elements of growth and structural dynamics have to do with demand
 - China middle income transition
 - US negative domestic aggregate demand shock
 - Southern Europe
 - At the global level: the degree of coordination in unwinding global imbalances and the question of an aggregate demand shortfall

The Argument

- In open economies, the level and composition of demand
 - Drive the supply side evolution of the economy
 - Are important in understanding defective growth patterns and the recoveries from them
 - Provide insights into the employment challenges of advanced economies
- The level can exceed or fall short of output
- The composition
 - Tradable and non-tradable
 - Government, consumption, private investment, public investment
- In many economies these get out of balance giving rise to defective growth models
- Recovering involves more than restoring the level it involves changing the composition
- This is much more complex than in a closed economy which is the implicit background of much growth theory



What is Stable and Where do the Structural Shifts Occur?

- Demand in composition is relatively stable across time and countries at a given income level
- Non-tradable supply is therefore also stable
- But the tradable supply side is highly variable across countries
 - Compare Sweden, Germany and the USA
- In the face of negative demand shocks and recoveries from them, the ability to expand the scope of the tradable sector and access external demand is crucial
- For developing economies, this will be "old hat" huge external demand is a primary driver of growth in early stages because it relaxes the severe domestic demand constraint


Demand Constraints in and Open Economy Why is the Tradable/Non-tradable distinction Important

- Tradable versus non-tradable sectors what are they?
- Roughly 2/3 of advanced economy is non-tradable
 - On the demand side but therefore on the supply side as well unless current account surplus or deficit is large
- Non-tradable sector is driven in level and composition by domestic aggregate demand
- Tradable sector is quite different
 - The supply side has access to domestic and external demand
 - Productivity constrained rather than demand constrained
 - The demand side has access to domestic and external supply
 - Domestic aggregate demand can exceed GDP without inflation
 - i.e. you can run a persistent current account deficit provided external conditions facilitate it
- There are more potential defective growth patterns in open economies
 - And they can persist for some time before they break down

Excess Domestic Demand and a Demand Shock


- What happens?
- Prior to the shock the non-tradable sector becomes too big and reduces the scope and at the margin the competitiveness of the tradable sector
- After the shock growth slows or is negative
- And the economy is structurally out of balance:
 - To recover you may need some restoration of domestic demand (say via deleveraging and balance sheet repair)
 - But you also need a shift toward the tradable sector on the supply side, that is toward external demand
 - In a relative flexible dynamic economy, that is what happens
 - Nominal wages and incomes stop growing and real wages decline with the rate of inflation
 - Labor and capital flow toward the tradable side which expands in share, scope and growth
 - Having your own exchange rate helps

You Can See Some These Patterns Clearly in the US Case



Real Imports of Goods & Services Percentage change from previous peak, Seasonally Adjusted


Quarters from previous peak




Real Exports of Goods & Services Percentage change from previous peak, Seasonally Adjusted

Quarters from previous peak

US Growth




US Employment




Growth and Employment in the US

Tradable	0.21	Tradable	0.17	Tradable	0.27
Nontradable	0.79	Nontradable	0.83	Nontradable	0.73
% of Gain		% of Gain		% of Gain	
1990-2000		2001-2007		2009-mid 2013	
EMPLOYMENT					
Tradable	0.34	Tradable	0.41	Tradable	0.56
Nontradable	0.66	Nontradable	0.59	Nontradable	0.44
% of Gain		% of Gain		% of Gain	
1990-2000		2001-2007		2009-mid 2012	
VALUE ADDED					




Real Gross Private Domestic Investment

Percentage change from previous peak, Seasonally Adjusted




Quarters from previous peak

Total Employment - Establishment Survey Percentage change from previous peak, Seasonally Adjusted, Nonfarm Business




Months from previous peak




The Assisted Growth Model Federal Reserve Balance Sheet

SUMMARY VIEW Millions of Dollars




G20 Countries: General Government Debt to GDP Ratios (2000 – 2015)



27

EXHIBIT 1 | Net Expected Tax Revenues Are Not Adequate to Continue Funding Current Social Policies





Official government debt
Unfunded liabilities

Sources: Jagadeesh Gokhal, "Measuring the Unfunded Obligations of European Countries," 2009; OECD. Note: Unfunded liabilities are the difference between the projected cost of continuing current government programs and net expected tax revenues. Government debt based on 2011 forecasts from the OECD.


What About Southern Europe?

- There are two problems
 - Very large divergences in nominal unit labor costs relative to German
 - Impediments to structural shifts toward the tradable sector and external demand – in labor markets (also capital markets and product markets)
 - These are the impediments Germany had and removed in the reforms of 2003-2006
- Inflation and the common currency
- Nevertheless convergence in productivity and growth in the tradable sector is starting to happen
- The speed is determined mainly by structural flexibility in labor, capital and product markets
- Most countries have not yet had labor market reforms as large as those that occurred in Germany in 2003-2006






Italy: Productivity and Wage Growth



Productivity and wage growth; Absolute and relative to the euro area

Blanchard April 2006

Italian Investment Rate









Figure 11 Growth in real wages and labour productivity in developed economies, 1999–2007 and 2008–11 (%)


Employment and Distribution Additional Headwinds Beyond the Growth Challenges

- Employment has been adversely affected by the negative growth shocks
- But that compounded a longer term adverse trend in employment across the tradable and non-tradable sectors
 - Which I will show you in a minute
- These longer term trends are the combined result of powerful technological and global market forces
- The latter includes
 - The increasingly efficient atomization of global supply chains
 - The rise in size of the emerging economies (now over 50% of global GDP) especially China













Value Added per Worker



Value added per worker and the global economy This is often mistaken for a "normal" productivity increase












Figure 3: Percent Change in Employment Shares by Occupation Group






Non-Routine Manual


Employment: R -1.15 THE TREND IS THE CYCLE: JOB POLARIZATION AND JOBLESS RECOVERIES Log value -1.2 Nir Jaimovich Henry E. Siu -1.25 -1.3 -1.35 2000 2005 1970 1975 1988 1985 1990 Period 1995 2010


Routine – Manual and Cognitive

USA Income Distribution Trends

Income Inequality and Political Polarization 1947 - 2009







COUNTRY	INCOME OF THE RICHEST 10% OVER THE POOREST 10%	INCOME OF THE RICHEST 20% OVER THE POOREST 20%	GINI COEFFICIENT
COUNTRY	POOREST 10%	POOREST 20%	GINI COEFFICIENT
Australia	12.5	7	35.2
Austria	6.9	4.4	29.1
Belgium	8.2	4.9	33
Brazil	51.3	21.8	57
Canada	9.4	5.5	32.6
China (PRC)	21.6	12.2	46.9
Denmark	8.1	4.3	24.7
Finland	5.6	3.8	26.9
France	9.1	5.6	32.7
Germany	6.9	4.3	28.3
Greece	10.2	6.2	34.3
India	8.6	5.6	36.8
Israel	13.4	7.9	39.2
Italy	11.6	6.5	36
Japan	4.5	3.4	24.9
South Korea	7.8	4.7	31.6
Mexico	24.6	12.8	46.1
Netherlands	9.2	5.1	30.9
New Zealand	12.5	6.8	36.2
Norway	6.1	3.9	25.8
Russia	12.7	7.6	39.9
South Africa	33.1	17.9	57.8
Spain	10.3	6	34.7
Sweden	6.2	4	25
Switzerland	9	5.5	33.7
Turkey	16.8	9.3	43.6
United Kingdom	13.8	7.2	
United States	15.9	8.4	40.8


Key Ingredients in the Changing Growth Patterns

Michael Spence Nanjing June 2014 China and the Middle Income Transition

- Third largest economy if Europe is counted as a unit
- About half the size of US or Europe
 - Will be same size in 10-15 years
 - When it grows at 8% real that is the equivalent of 4% growth in Europe or North America
- Leading export market for India, Brazil, Japan, Korea, Australia, most of east Asia, in the near future, Africa
- Huge amount at stake
- The growth model for first 30 years yielded impressive results, but has reached the end of its useful life
- The most common developing country mistake is to find a successful strategy for growth and do it too long
- Despite the high growth, there is widespread consensus (internally and externally) that reform momentum declined seriously in the past decade – and that a reversal of that trend is critical to alter and then sustain the growth pattern at this level of income


Five High Speed Transitions

- Japan
- Korea
- Taiwan/China
- Hong Kong/China
- Singapore
- None at China's scale
- None with strong global economic headwinds
- No predecessor was systemically important
- Most importantly China's growth depends on no slippage in generating domestic aggregate demand
 - Unlike earlier cases (Korea, Taiwan. China, Japan)
 - One way to do that is high and rising investment levels but that will drive investment returns (private and social) down and is not a sustainable growth pattern
 - This is all well understood in China so the challenge is to shift the mix to consumption and high return investment – and that takes major system reforms



World Bank database

China: Disposable Income Declining Percentage of National Income Combined with Household Savings at 30% Consumption is below 40% of GDP




Explaining China's Low Consumption: The Neglected Role of Household Income

Jahangir Aziz and Li Cui

IMF WORKING PAPER 2007


Components of Savings: The Increase is in the Corporate Sector Built in bias in the system to investment without adequate risk adjusted return filters




Investment-Led Growth is Showing Signs of Reaching Its Limits...

Demand Contributions to GDP Growth

Incremental Capital / Output Ratio



...Which is Also Evident in Credit Channel Losing Traction on Growth



Marginal Return of New Credit

SOURCE: CEIC, PBOC, PIMCO


New Credit/GDP vs. GDP Growth

By International Comparisons China's Debt Level is Not Flashing Red;

Trajectory, Channels, and Rate of Growth is Source of Risk


Total Debt/GDP Ratios By Country (2012)

Composition of China's Total Debt to GDP




NPL Trends Linked to Nominal GDP Growth





Potential for Households is Significant When Viewed through Both National Income & Balance Sheet Perspectives



SOURCE: CEIC, PBOC

Old Growth Patterns

- Growth in the past driven by
 - Deployment of underutilized human capital
 - Productivity growth
 - Very high levels of investment
 - Exports and the tradable sector
 - Financial policies that repressed savers and lowered cost of capital
 - Leverage in the post crisis period

These Growth Patterns Have Reached the End of Their Useful Life

- Higher Public Investment
 - Generates aggregate demand
 - But pushed into low social return territory at the margin
 - Social return can be thought of as the present value of future increments to GDP, divided by the cost of the investment
 - That makes it a defective growth model
- Export sector is contributing little to growth
 - Still important
 - Advanced countries growing very slowly
 - Other developing countries dependent on China
 - China has a huge market share globally in tradable sectors
- Household income < 60% of GDP and savings 30%
 - Puts consumption at less than 40%
- But that is where the aggregate demand needs to come from
 - And if it doesn't then the evolution of the supply side will be distorted and eventually unsustainable as a growth pattern

Historical Note

- Five economies went through the middle income transition at high speed (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore)
- All are smaller and did it when the advanced countries were 65% or more of the global economy and growing
- China is doing it at much larger scale with very little help from the export sector.
- So the handoff to domestic consumption is more important
- Since it is impossible to synchronize this precisely, and the government should be unwilling to fill in the gap with investment, there may be a transitional growth slow down in China
- The government does have valuable services to deliver and that can legitimately be used to ease the transition (education, health, social security)

Growth

- In the long run, it is driven by productivity growth
- In the short and medium run, growth can be constrained by demand
- It is not just the level of aggregate demand that matters
- The composition matters too
 - Household Consumption
 - Private Investment
 - Public expenditures
 - Public investment
 - External demand in the tradable sector
- The evolution of the supply follows demand in a flexible economy like that of China or the USA
- So the composition of demand guides the supply side evolution
- If one is out of balance the other will be also

Chinese Growth

- Has slowed in part because it is demand constrained
- That is OK and is part of the structural transformation of the economy
- Export sector is shifting up in terms of value added
 - External demand growth is weak
- Policy makers are reigning in low return investment
- Rapid growth of credit and leverage is being cut back
- Both of these would be the wrong way to relax the demand constraint
- These levers (credit and public sector investment) were used as a crisis response
 - That's OK if not persistent
 - Investment was pushed into low return territory at the margin
 - Credit created asset bubbles and non performing loans

Elements of Structural Change as the Growth Model Shifts

Indicator	1995-2010	2011-2015	2016-20	2021-25	2026-30
GDP growth (percent per year)	9.9	8.6	7.0	5.9	5.0
Labor growth	0.9	0.3	-0.2	-0.2	-0.4
Labor productivity growth	8.9	8.3	7.1	6.2	5.5
Structure of economy (end of period, %)					
Investment/GDP ratio	46.4	42	38	36	34
Consumption/GDP ratio	48.6	56	60	63	66
Industry/GDP ratio	46.9	43.8	41.0	38.0	34.6
Services/GDP ratio	43.0	47.6	51.6	56.1	61.1
Share of employment in agriculture	38.1	30.0	23.7	18.2	12.5
Share of employment in services	34.1	42.0	47.6	52.9	59.0

TABLE 1 China: Projected growth pattern assuming steady reforms and no major shock

Where is the 7% Growth Coming From?

- The short answer is that household incomes are rising now, reversing the past long term trend
- And the domestic service business sector in the non-tradable part of the economy is showing signs of growing quite rapidly.
- Retail is growing and online retail is exploding
 - China's online shopping market registered stunning growth last year.
 According to iResearch, China's online market in 2013 hit gross
 merchandise volume (GMV) of 1,841.0 billion yuan, up by 39.4% yoy.
 In particular, GMV for the B2C segment soared by 65.2% yoy.
- These are important elements in the structural changes and shift the economy to a new and different kind of sustainable growth pattern

Recent Growth by Category

	Nominal growth, yoy (%)		
	FY13	1Q14	Apr
Grain, oil, food, beverages, tobacco and liquor	13.9	10.1	11.9
Clothing, shoes, hats and textiles	11.6	8.7	11.2
Cosmetics	13.3	9.3	6.6
Gold, silver and jewellery	25.8	4.7	-30.0
Products for daily use	14.1	8.7	10.7
Sports and entertainment products	7.2	1.3	-1.1
Home appliances and video equipment	14.5	9.2	2.9
Chinese and Western medicines	17.7	16.8	14.2
Stationery and office accessories	<mark>11.8</mark>	9.5	18.0
Furniture	21.0	14.2	15.5
Telecommunications equipment	20.4	14.7	28.8
Petroleum and related products	9.9	6.0	8.0
Automobiles	10.4	12.3	12.3
Building and decoration materials	22.1	12.2	16.7

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, PRC




Exhibit 16: Gross merchandise volume of China's online shopping market, 2010 to 2013

The top seven provinces and municipalities in terms of foreign trade va

Provinces/ Municipalities	Foreign trade value (billion yuan)		
Guangdong	1,360		
Jiangsu	777.0		
Shanghai	669.3		
Beijing	666.4		
Zhejiang	464.1		
Shandong	402.9		
Fujian	237.3		

ource: China Customs


Exhibit 34: Foreign exchange reserves by quarter, 2Q13 to 1Q14

USD billion

	Accumulation	End of the quarter
FY13	509.7	3,821.3
2Q13	54.1	3, <mark>4</mark> 96.7
3Q13	166.0	3,662.7
4Q13	158.7	3,821.3
1Q14	126.8	3,948.1

Source: State Administration of Foreign Exchange, PRC

Exhibit 35: USD-CNY and EUR-CNY daily fixing rates, May 2013 to May 2014



Source: State Administration of Foreign Exchange

GLOBAL ECONOMY OUTLOOK

Exhibit 47: GDP growth forecasts by the International Monetary Fund

	yoy growin (76)			
	2013	2014 (Forecasts)	2015 (Forecasts)	
World economy	3.0	3.6	3.9	
Advanced economies	1.3	2.2	2.3	
- US	1.9	2.8	3.0	
- Eurozone ²⁵	-0.5	1.2	1.5	
- Japan	1.5	1.4	1.0	
Emerging markets and developing economies	4.7	1.9	5.3	
- China	77	7.5	73	
- India	4.4	5.4	6.4	
- ASEAN-5 ²⁶	5.2	4.9	5.4	
- Brazil	2.3	1.8	2.7	
Russia	1.3	1.3	2.3	

yoy growth (%)

Source:International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2014


The Financial Sector

- In the past, the financial sector was dominated by state owned entities, primarily banks
- Returns to savers were controlled or repressed to lower the cost of capital for the investment lead growth model.
- Access to credit was not a level playing field with SOE's and governments in the front of the queue
- This is now counterproductive

Shadow Banking

- The shadow banking system with higher returns (and a richer menu) for savers and alternative sources of credit to SME's is part of financial sector development
- And it is important
- That is why the policy approach is not to suppress it but rather to regulate it properly to prevent naïve and excessive risk taking
- State owned banks are important intermediaries (and some what shadow banking suppressed)
- But with with SOB's as intermediaries there is an implicit government guarantee and that can and probably does lead to excessive risk taking


Wealth Management Products






Game Changing Technologies


- Shale Gas
- Mobile Phones
- 3D Printing
- "Smart" Robotics with Sensors
 - Manufacturing
 - Logistics
- Digital Capital
 - Displacement of Labor




Location




Conventional and Shale Gas Reserves



Mobile Phone Growth: Elimination of the Digital Divide





3D Printing




Electronics Assembly





Global Flows


- Goods
- Services
- Capital/Finance
- People
- Data, Information, Knowledge



Goods









- 1 2001 services flows are estimated based on 55 percent coverage with a bilateral data set.
- 2 2011 services flows are estimated based on 61 percent coverage with a bilateral data set.

SOURCE: Comtrade; IMF Balance of Payments; World Development Indicators, World Bank; McKinsey Global Institute





SOURCE: Telegography; World Trade Organization; McKinsey Global Institute analysis